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In the Supreme Court 
olthe Slate ol Utah 
CLYDE J. KNAPP. OLIVES. KNAPP. 
JEFF KNAPP. an infant. by Clyde 
J. Knapp, his Guardian ad Litem. 
VICKIE KNAPP. an infant. by Clyde 
J. Knapp. her Guardian ad Litem, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
vs. 
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION 
OF AMERICA. a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
8875 
For convenience, defendant and appellant will be re-
ferred to as defendant. plaintiffs and respondents will be 
referred to collectively as plaintiffs. and plaintiff and respond-
ent 'Clyde J. Knapp, will be referred to as Knapp. All italics 
are ours. To the extent that plaintiffs do not disagree with the 
Statement of Facts made in defendant's Brief. they will re-
frain from repeating such facts and will confine their Statement 
to facts as to which they may disagree with defendant or 
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2 
which they feel were omitted by defendant. Furthermore, 
their Statement of Facts will be confined, so far as possible, 
to the facts pertaining to the Points raised by and argued in 
Defendant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action by plaintiffs against defendant seeking 
to rescind, on the ground of fraud and deceit, a transaction 
under which plaintiffs sold and assigned to defendant, the 
sellers' interest in two separate contracts of sale ie., {a) one 
covering real estate at 10834 South State Street, Salt Lake 
County, 21 shares of water stock. together with all equipment, 
machinery and livestock thereon, on which there was an agreed 
balance then owing of $27,875.00, and, {b) a second con-
tract covering certain livestock located on said real property. 
on which there was then a balance owing of $6,508.03, making 
a total agreed price and reasonable value of $34,383.03. 
Plaintiffs received in payment thereof $4,383.03 cash and 
1500 shares at $20.00 per share or $30,000.00 worth of the 
capital stock of defendant company. Plaintiffs offered and 
'pow offer to return to defendant everything,........cash, with inter-
est thereon, and stock,........received from :defendant in the trans-
action upon being restored to a status quo position by defend-
ant, or to the extent that defendant may not be able to restore 
'all of plaintiffs' property, to have a money judgment for the 
value of that which may not be restored, ·with interest on such 
value from the date of the transaction, December 30, 1954. 
Plaintiffs have offered, by stipulation, to accept from 
defendant, if same is tendered, the real estate on South State 
Street and 21 shares of water stock therewith, subject to an 
outstanding contract of sale to a Mr. Morrison and to credit 
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the remaining balance of the sale price owing by the buyer. 
amounting to approximately $30,000.00, on any money 
judgment which might be awarded plaintiffs. (Tr. 70). 
V. H. Heaton has offered :to retransfer this property so 
;sold to Mr. Morrison, to defendant. subject to his contract of 
~ale with Morrison. and to assign to defendant his interest. 
as ;Seller. in Morrison's contract, upon receiving payment for 
his, Heaton's. equity, should defendant elect to return said 
property to plaintiffs and receive credit on th judgment. ( T r. 
252. 254, 859, to 861). 
The ,trial court found all material issues in favor of 
plaintiffs and entered in said case Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law ( R. 16) finding that in connection with 
the foregoing transaction, and to induce plaintiffs to sell to 
defendant the aforementioned contracts of sale defendant had 
made to plaintiffs the many false representations as set forth 
in said Findings. It would be hard to find in the books. a 
case in which so many and such flagrant misrepresentations 
were made in one transaction as occured in this matter. If 
the court were interested in ex~ining the evidence regarding 
these misrepresentations, it would be found, among other 
things, that whereas defendant represented to plaintiff in its 
Financial Statement of September 30, 1954, ( P. 4). that it 
had liabilities of only $3,429.49, exclusive of capital stock 
liability. it actually had liability, as shown by the audit made 
by plaintiffs' auditor, Mr. Cummings, (P. 62) of $54,047.77. 
(Tr. 18, 333, 340. 484. 500). or roughly fifteen times the 
amount represented; instead of having $63,875.22 of mortgage 
loans, p.s represented ( P. 4). Mr. Cummings found that de-
fendant actually had only $4,814.22 of such :mortgages, (P. 
62. Tr. 445-447). or about 1/15 as much. Many other just as 
glaring instances of deceit were alleged. proved and found by 
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the Court. The Court found present all elements of actionable 
fraud and deceit. The Court found in favor of plaintiffs all 
other facts necessary to entitle thelm to rescind said contract 
and recover judgment against defendant. It found that on and 
prior to January 5, 1955, plaintiffs Clyde J. Knapp and Olive 
S. Knapp were the owners of sellers' equity in the contract of 
sale of certain livestock and other personal property which they 
then owned and that there was a balance owing from the 
buyers, Volma W. Heaton and Ellen Heaton, of $6,508.03 
on the purchase price, which was the then agreed and reason-
able value of said plaintiff's equity therein and that said two 
plaintiffs were also then the owners of sellers' equity in a 
contract of sale with Volma W. Heaton and D. H. Heaton, 
covering certain real estate, water stock and personal property 
on which the balance then owing and the agreed and reason-
able value of said equity was $27,875.00, making a com-
bined total owing on said two contracts of $34,383.03 which 
was the reasonable and .agreed value thereof. said contracts 
being identified as parts of Exhibits P. 5, P. 6 and P. 7; that 
on January 5, 1955 plaintiff, Clyde J. Knapp, and defendant 
signed the Agreement, (Ex. P. 9) providing for the exchange 
of the contracts o/ sale above referred to for $4,383.03 cash 
and 1500 shares of defendant's capital stock and that said 
contracts were thereupon assigned to the defendant and that 
conveyance was made to defendant of the property described 
in said contracts, subject to the rights of the purchasers under 
said contracts. The court specifically found, and the evidence 
supports such finding ( R. 21 ) , that plaintiffs did not have 
knowledge, prior to August 30, 1955 of facts which would 
have prompted a person of ordinary prudence to make neces-
sary investigations as to the truth or falsity of the fraudulent 
representations cO'mplained of; that shortly after August 30, 
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1955 plaintiff Clyde J. Knapp received a letter from defend-
ant's then attorney, Reese Anderson, (Ex. P. 11, Tr. 42, 43, 
44, 164) and he then first became aware of facts which 
charged him with the duty to investigate as to the matters 
complained of: that he then immediately consulted his attorney 
and employed hm to investigate and take necessary action 
(R. 21. Tr. 50 to 53): that plaintiffs did not unreasonably 
delay the investigating or giving notice of the intention to re-
scind after they became aware of facts which charged them 
with notice of matters complained of and that on October 
2~ 1955 plaintiffs formally notified defendants that plaintiffs 
elected to rescind said transaction in its entirety, (Ex. P. 15) , 
which offer was declined; that plaintiffs have ever since been 
and are now willing and able to rescind and return to defend-
ant all consideration, cash and stock received from defendant. 
The court found ( R. 22) that almost immediately upon receiv~ 
ing from plaintiffs the assignments of contracts, defendant can-
celled said contracts. substituting therefor other and different 
contracts of sale of the property described in such contracts; 
that said defendant company subsequently cancelled said dif-
ferent and substituted contracts and permitted the livestock 
and other personal property to be sold for approximately 
$5,000.00. Findings were also made concerning the later dis-
position of the real property and water stock to Daniel H. 
Heaton and Eva W. Heaton and of the sale by them to J. G. 
Morrison. The court found that the value of the contracts so 
assigned, at the time of such assignment, was $34,383.03 and 
that by their agreEIDl:ent of January 5, 1955, ( P. 9), the 
parties fixed that as such value and that the purchase price 
thereof had been paid to plaintiffs by defendant in the sum 
of $4,383.03 cash and 1500 shares of stock. 
Appropriate Conclusions of Law were entered along 
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with a Decree giving to plaintiffs a money judgment for the bal-
ance owing on the two contracts assigned to defendant, with in-
terest, less the amount paid in cash to plaintiffs. with interest. 
and directing plaintiffs to return to defendant the 1500 shares 
of capital stock. The Decree .further provided that if within 60 
days, defendant conveyed to plaintiffs title to the Knapp real 
estate. subject only to the ~rights of the· buyer under the real 
estate contract dated August 5, 1955 between the Heatons 
as sellers and J. G. Morrison as buyer, together with proper 
transfer of sellers' rights under such contract, then the plain-
tiffs should credit defendant, on such judgment with the 
amount of the balance then owing by the buyer Morrison on 
said contract. Defendant makes no .complaint of the Findings, 
Conclusions or Decree of the court except on two points, 
which are the sole grounds of its appeal. to-wit: that (a) "If 
there was fraud. plaintiffs are now barred from asserting it by 
their lack of diligence in rescinding and by laches." and, (b) 
''There is no evidence to support the money judgment awarded 
plaintiffs in this action." 
On April 1, 1954, Daniel H. Heaton was employed 
as an agent of the defendant company to sell its capital stock 
at $20.00 a share (Ex. 27). Heaton contacted Knapp about 
November 1, 1954, soliciting him to buy stock in defendant 
company, and closed the deal on January 5. 1955, although 
~he transfer of contracts of sale and underlying properties was 
dated December 30, 1954, apparently dated back in order 
that the transaction would appear in the 1954 annual state-
ment. In the agreelnent of January 5, 1955, (P. 9, D. 20) 
it was stated: "The value of the capital stock of the company 
is $20.00 per share and the total value o/ the contracts o/ sale 
on all land, equipment and livestock to be assigned to the 
company by purchaser is $34,385.03." Note that the thing 
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sold and valued was the contracts and not the real estate or 
personal property which secured them. Simultaneously with 
the closing of the Knapp deal. defendant cancelled the Knapp 
contracts, which had been assigned to it, and wrote two new 
contracts (P. 33-34) which it dated 'December 30, 1954. 
reciting a sale price in one contract of $34,383.03 and in the 
other contract a sale price of $4,383.03 (Tr. 212, 218, 221 ). 
It should be noted that these new contracts specifically can-
celled the older contracts which Knapp had assigned to the 
company; that the buyers are not the same in the old and the 
new contracts; that the amounts of the sale price in each of 
the two new contracts differs entirely from the balance which 
was owing on each of the two old Knapp contracts. For in-
stance, there was owing on the old livestock contract $6,508.03 
when turned over by Knapp, whereas the new livestock con-
tract was for $4,383.03 only. The balance on the old Knapp 
real estate contract, with some personal property included 
therein, was $27.875.00, whereas the new contract for the 
same property recites a consideration of $34,383.03. The 
monthly payments on the two old contracts were $219.83 and 
$300.00 respectively, or a total of $519.83, whereas on the 
new contracts they were $175.38 and $83.04 respectively, or 
a total of $258.42. The description of the personal property 
in the old and the new contracts is different. Apparently the 
new contracts do not include all of the personal property em-
braced in the old ones. At this point, it became impossible for 
defendant to have restored Knapp to a status quo position. 
since his contracts had been annihilated and the new contracts 
bore no relationship to the old, the security behind each having 
been entirely changed and rearranged. None of this was known 
to Knapp until the trial of this case in July, 1957. (Tr. 121-
68-222-224) . 
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V olma Heaton injured his back early in 1955 and fell 
behind on payments on these new contracts. He was excused 
from making regular payments by defendant. (Tr. 231-2, 285-
6). About April 1, 1955, defendant requested Heaton to try 
to sell just the real property and water stock, without any live-
stock, machinery or equipment in order to get it in a position 
to qualify as an admissible asset. Heaton procured a buyer for 
the real property and water stock only at a price of $35,500.00, 
in the person of Mr. Van Zyverden whose man actually moved 
on the property and harvested some of the crops. This deal 
Jinally fell through because of a difficulty in title to the prop-
erty Van Zyverden was turning to defendant. At about the 
same time, Volma Heaton, with the consent of defendant, 
sold all of the livestock which had been included in the Knapp 
contracts for approximately $5,000.00, which he was allowed 
to keep as his equity in the properties. This made a total of 
$40,500.00 for which the Knapp property was thus arranged 
to be sold. (Tr. 226, 298, 305, 307). This additional act of 
stripping the real estate of all livestock rendered it abso-
lutely impossible for defendant to have restored plaintiffs 
to their status quo position. These transactions were entirely 
unknown to Knapp until the trial of this case. (Tr. 68-121-
222) . After the real property had come back to the defendant. 
it sold just the real estate and water, without any personal 
property, to Heaton in August of 1955 for $32.000. (Tr. 229, 
237, 238, 243, 244. 245, 297-8). \\'hen Knapp turned the 
contracts in there was a balance owing on the livestock contract 
of over $6500.00 which was now gone plus some other live-
stock. machinery and equipment, included in the so-called real 
estate contracts which likewise were gone. Heaton immediately 
sold just the real property and water. no personal property, to 
Morrison for $36,000.00, with $5,000.00 down, (Ex. P. 39, 
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Tr. 240, 242. 297) and Morrison's pa)trnents are right up to 
date. (Tr. 252). 
There was no offer ever made by the defendant to re-
turn to Knapp the contracts he had assigned to defendant or 
~ven of any of the underlying security described therein prior 
to the stockholders' meeting of May 10, 1955, or at any time 
prior to the first of August. 1955. (Tr. 156-7, 159, 166. 170. 
287. 288). Neither Knapp nor Heaton heard anything at the 
May 10. 1955 stockholders' meeting which caused them to 
suspect that Knapp had been defrauded in the original trans-
action some months earlier but the main thing of importance 
which they heard at said .meeting was the need of correcting 
the company's condition by changing its real estate into an 
acceptable form so it would become an admissible asset to the 
State Insurance Commission. (Tr. 134, 135). 
In its Brief. defendant refers to the letter of Reese An-
derson of August 30. 1955 (Ex. P. 11 ) , as being "rather 
mild in tone, merely requesting a prompt decision on signing the 
voting trust agreement.'' The exhibit enclosed with the letter. 
ie., Trust Agreement, which when signed would be a "blank 
check'' to the trustees to do anything they wanted with plain-
tiff's' stock, was. on the contrary, "a bombshell" calculated to 
startle any stockholder. It was followed by a series of further 
communications from defendant and finally resulted. in early 
November 1955, in the taking over of the company. by out 
of State people who put in $200.000 cash at $20.00 per share. 
This resulted in the existing stockholders receiving only $25,000 
of stock for their stock for which they had paid $338,000, or 
one share for each thirteen shares. Under this arrangement 
plaintiffs would get 111 shares of the same par value for their 
1500 shares representing a loss of over 12/ 13ths of their in-
vestment. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS. WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME 
AFTER DISCOVERING THE FACTS CONSTITUT-
ING FRAUD. ELECTED TO RESCIND. NOTIFIED 
DEFENDANT OF SUCH ELECTION AND OFFERED 
TO RESTORE DEFENDANT TO STATUS QUO. 
(a) Plaintiffs acted with due diligence and are not 
barred /rom rescission by lack o/ diligence in re-
scinding or by laches. 
(b) Delay alone, without detriment or change in po-
sition, caused by the delay, is not laches or a de-
fense to an action in rescission. 
(c) Conclusion o/ trial court, as to whether party has 
acted promptly to rescind a contract, or is guilty 
of laches, will not be set aside by appellate court 
i/ the conclusion /inds substantial support in the 
evidence. 
POINT II. 
T H ERE IS LEGAL AND COMPETENT EVI-
DENCE TO SUPPORT THE MONEY JUDGMENT 
A\\'ARDED PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFFS, \VITHIN A REASONABLE TIME 
AFTER DISCOVERING THE FACTS CONSTITUT-
ING FRAUD. ELECTED TO RESCIND, NOTIFIED 
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DEFENDANT OF SUCH ELECTION AND OFFERED 
TO RESTORE DEFENDANT TO STATUS QUO. 
(a) Plaintiffs acted with due .diligence and are not 
barred /rom rescission by lack o/ diligence in re-
scinding or by laches. 
Defendant contends. in its Brief. that if there was fraud, 
plaintiffs are now barred from asserting it by their lack of dili-
gence in rescinding and by laches. These contentions, plain-
tiffs deny. 
Plaintiffs maintain and we submit that the evidence 
shows that the first suspicion plaintiffs had of fraud was early 
in September 1955, when Knapp received Reese Anderson's 
letter of August 30, 1955, (Ex. P. 11, Tr. 42. 43, 44, 164). 
What did Knapp do? He went at once to his attorney for 
counsel as to what his rights were and placed the matter in 
his hands. (Tr. 50 to 53). The testimony shows that the attor-
ney proceeded immediately to the office of the Insurance Com-
missioner to obtain all inf'mtnation possible as to the financial 
condition of defendant and whether or not it had committed 
fraud on plaintiffs. (Tr. 50 to 53, 171). He was informed 
that an audit was being made for the Insurance Commission 
and that in due time it would be made available for public 
inspection. Knapp, who was working ·in the southern part of 
the state and came home only on week ends. inquired each 
time he was in town as to what had been found out. He was 
told that the attorney had contacted the Insurance Commis-
sioner repeatedly but that the audit had· not been completed. 
Knapp testified that it was either a question of obtaining the 
facts which this audit would disclose or having an independent 
audit made by himself. at considerable expense. and which 
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would take longer than to wait for completion of the one in 
progress. He testified that the audit was completed and ex-
hibited to the attorney in the early part of October; that the 
attorney assured him that he was having the audit analyzed 
and compared with the September 30. 1954 ( P .4) financial 
statement of defendant, used in selling Knapp, and was ob-
taining additional information and evidence to determine 
whether he had been defrauded. He was advised of his rights 
by his attorney and on October 25. 1955, only about six weeks 
after he first even suspected there might be fraud, he served 
definite notice of election to rescind, (P. 15) on defendant. 
Khapp testified that in September or October he notified 
Tucker. the representative of the financiers who took over the 
company by reorganization, that he would probably ask for 
his property back. We submit that this notice of rescission was 
served in a very short time. and with all necessary diligence on 
defendant, considering the unusual circumstances of the case 
and the need for obtaining detailed and technical infortnation 
in order to know what the rights were. This should be con-
clusive of plaintiffs' rights to rescind and be restored to status 
quo or if that cannot be done to have a money judgment 
against defendant. 
But, defendant argues that plaintiff learned of facts at an 
earlier date which should have made him suspicious that he 
had been defrauded, thus putting him under the duty of in-
vestigating such facts. It seems to ·maintain that it became the 
duty of plaintiff. within a reasonable time after the first of 
these matters came to his attention, to notify defendant of de-
dsion to rescind and that failure to do so constituted laches. 
Plaintif'fs deny this. 
What are the alleged facts relied on by defendant? First. 
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it isays that defendant offered before the May 10, 1955 meet-
ing to trade Knapp back his property for the consideration he 
received. The only testimony supporting any such thing is the 
hearsay evidence of Mr. Lowe that at said meeting he talked 
to Heaton about the objection of the Insurance Conunissioner 
to the two large Heaton and Knapp properties and Heaton 
said that he had had a conversation with Bullard a short time 
before when he was infonned of this objection. They talked 
about the voting at the meeting and Heaton said that both he 
and Knapp had been approached by Bullard with respect to 
trrading the property back. (Tr. 691). Both Knapp and Heaton 
categorically denied that any offer of trade back ever was men-
tioned at this time or at any other time before August, 1955, 
(Tr. 156, 157 to 159, 166, 170, 287, 288). Certainly the pre-
ponderance of the evidence is that no such offer ever was made, 
but further, we submit that had there been such an offer, it is 
evident that it had to do with the need to dispose of the two 
very large pieces of real estate because they were not admissible 
assets. There would be utterly no inference from this need that 
fraud had been practiced on Knapp in their acquisition. Further-
more, under the circwnstances of this case and the law, delay 
from early May to October would not constitute laches, if such 
offer had ever been made, especially as it couldn't have re-
sulted in any detriment to or change in the position of defend-
ant, because it had already disposed of the contracts which 
Knapp had turned to it, as shall hereafter be shown. Defend-
ant defeats its own argument when it first says that the purpose 
of the alleged offer was to change the two large properties into 
admissible assets and in the next breath says that the motive 
was that Bullard wanted to retire the hostile stock of Heaton 
and Knapp so he could keep his job. Neither of these reasons 
would suggest fraud a half a year earlier. 
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Second, defendant states that failure to pay the proposed 
10% dividend should have caused Knapp to suspect fraud. We 
submit that the mere failure to pay this dividend, standing 
alone, until the later audit disclosed the true financial con-
dition of defendant and that it was impossible to have paid a 
dividend of any sort, since defendant was insolvent, was not 
calculated to make Knapp suspect fraud, but could then be 
deemed merely a failure to keep a promise. Later, when the 
true facts were developed by the audit, it became obvious that 
in making this promise, fraud had ben committed, since there 
w.as no possibility for a dividend to have been legally paid 
and Bullard ·knew this and never intended to keep his promise 
when made. 
Third, defendant argues that since Knapp had heard 
rumors that Bullard was turning down business because he 
didn't like the sale!man, this was enough to put him on notice 
that he had been defrauded a half year earlier. \Vhile, if 
true, this would indicate a .strange manager, we ask how in the 
world it would possibly suggest fraud against Knapp? 
Fourth, defendant lays great stress on the meeting of 
May 10, 1955, as something which should have put Knapp 
on notice that he had been defrauded. \ Vhile, no doubt. this 
was an interesting meeting and touched on quite .a few subjects, 
we have searched, in. vain. for anything which happened there 
which could have made Knapp feel that he had been de-
frauded months earlier. when the transaction was closed 
All of the discussion and complaints. there Yoiced, had to do 
with current operations. According to Knapp. there was talk of 
a suit against the company for commissions; discussion regard-
ing the election of directors; a considerable part of the day was 
devoted to the dispute about voting, about the Insurance Com-
rt: 
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missioner giving trouble regarding the large blocks of Heaton 
and Knapp real estate; talk of doctors bringing capital into the 
c<tnpany to supply the needed admissible assets; a brief discus-
sion of financial conditions; much discussion regarding Knapp's 
and Heaton's property not being acceptable; but to all of this 
Bullard replied and assured those present that corrective steps 
were being taken. There was some discussion about the order of 
the Insurance Commissioner but Knapp stated that there 
seemed to be no alarm on the part of the officers of the com-
pany because they were going to make such corrections as were 
necessary and were going to correct the matter of the two land 
items to make them ad6issible. To this question "Then it is 
your memory that the only things that were discussed which 
hal to be corrected were the insurance properties. the so-called 
Heaton property and the Knapp fallffi property?". he answered, 
''Those are the only things I recall of any importance that was 
to be done." When pressed by counsel on cross examination as 
to what was said after the Heaton and Knapp properly were 
disallowed, Knapp replied: "It was not an alarming situation. 
They were going to correct it. That was understood.'' (Tr. 130 
to 149). Heaton confirmed that the big question before the 
meeting w.as the problem of these big properties and their dispo-
sition to make the assets admissible, (Tr. 312). Lowe testified 
'that George McMillan asked if it were not true that the Insur-
ance Commissioner had served notice of revocation, and that 
Bullard had replied that it had to do only with two blocks of 
property mentioned in the March 31. 1955letter, (P. 52) and 
that they felt this was going to be worked out. (Tr. 698). 
Lowe further testified regarding the discussion concerning these 
two large properties and stated that Mr. Bergesen asked if the 
Insurance Commissioner had not put defendant on notice that 
the two big properties were too large. He said Bullard admitted 
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that some question had been raised, but that the company had 
a solution to the two blocks of property and they were going 
to have it worked out in short order, ( T r. 696.) Defendant's 
other witness, Purrington, testified similarly, (Tr. 847, 848, 
852, 855). lt will also be noted that in P. 52, the letter from 
the Insurance Commissioner to Mr. Lowe, of March 31, 1955, 
the principal item mentioned was these two parcels of real 
estate. This is true also of other communications. It is obvious, 
that as Knapp said, the main thing discussed and which made 
an impression on him and on Heaton was the problem of ad-
missible assets, as affected by these two large properties and 
certainly there was nothing about that which caused any sus-
picion of fraud. It was just a current problem which needed 
solution and a problem which could not possibly have arisen 
until after the purchase of the stock by plaintiffs. Knapp 
testified that on the basis of what he heard at the meet-
ing, he did not consider that his stock interest was in jeop-
ardy to any great extent, if they carried through what they 
were planning to do to correct the situation, and that he knew 
the value was in the property and it was only a matter of the 
changing of the form of the assets, (Tr. 136). Defendant, it-
self. apparently agrees that Knapp's chief concern gro\\ing out 
of this .meeting was that corrective measures, promised by 
Bullard to change the nature of the Heaton and Knapp real 
estate assets, which made up a large part of defendant's assets, 
be taken. Knapp stated that nothing said at this meeting made 
him suspicious that fraud had been committed on him when 
he purchased his stock in 195---t. (Tr. 163). There \Ye have 
Knapp's uncontradicted statement and we believe that any one 
else who attended that meeting would have felt the same way 
about it. It was admitted that Knapp was probably not present 
during the whole time of the meeting, ( Tr. 170, 844), and that 
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he might have been out. as testified to by Mr. Lowe, (Tr. 711. 
712). Defendant's witness Purrington admitted that there 
was great confusion in the meeting hall with people trying to 
get the floor, IT r. 845); that there were discussions going on 
between and among different groups while the meeting was in 
progress. (Tr. 846). He and Lowe testified that there was only 
one microphone in the hall. which was on the rostrum and that 
those in the body of the hall did not use it, (Tr. 717, 720. 
846). Purrington admitted that his only recollection of what 
occurred at the meeting was from a tape recording and that 
some parts of that were garbled. (Tr. 846). It was further testi-
fied that the meeting was held in a large room and that it was 
possible that sQllle things were said which were not heard by 
all of those present; that there were several trying to get the 
floor at the same time; that there were three groups in the hall 
besides some scattered around and on the stand. Mr. Lowe 
testified to this, (Tr. 717. 720). Although Mr. Lowe pur-
ported to relate all that transpired at the meeting, he omitted 
several things mentioned by two other witnesses and although 
one witness said that Reese Anderson had talked about what 
would happen to defendant unless it was refinanced, { T r. 
826), Lowe stated that he remembered no such thing having 
been said. (Tr. 699). It is apparent from this that Knapp was 
not present during all of the meeting and that in view of the 
confusion in the hall. some things might have been said which 
Knapp did not hear. because Lowe himself failed to hear some 
things that were reported to have been said. 
'Defendant next refers to the financial statement of April 
20. 1955, {D. 68) and to the other one, (P. 69) and thinks 
that some differences between certain figures therein and those 
shown in the September 30, 1954 statement should have put 
plaintiffs on notice they had been defrauded. We submit that 
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in the first place, Knapp had no recollection of having seen 
D. 68 (Tr. 136, 137) and he thinks that he got P. 69 by mail 
later. Lowe testified he didn't know whether Knapp got either 
D. 68 or P. 69 at the May;meeting, (Tr. 712). Lowe said the 
statement was distributed either at the May meeting or before 
June 30, 1955, (Tr. 710). It is therefore likely that Knapp 
did not obtain any such statement but in any event, of course, 
Knapp didn't have the September 30, 1954 statement before 
him for comparison when he received P. 69 and the difference 
in the items mentioned by defendant would make no im-
pression and, in fact, the differences could well have actually 
occurred in the operation of the company during the period in-
volved. We point 10ut that the folffis and method of prepara-
tion of the two statements, September 30, 1954, (Ex. P. 4) 
and the one of April 30, 1955 (Ex. D. 68) are so vastly dif-
ferent that companisons of figures would be impossible by any-
one other than an accountant, even if he had been in possession 
of' both such statements, which Knapp was not. and that even 
an accountant would have had difficulty in any such compari-
son. It certainly would not have been apparent to a person 
such as Knapr\;2 
1
arouse suspicion placing him under duty to 
take the technicaL :and expensive procedure of ascertaining the 
truthfulness of the April 30 statmnent. We submit that there 
was nothing here to cause suspicion of fraud. 
We fail to see the relevancy of defendant's labored 
argument that Knapp didn't take over the prerogatives of the 
officers of the defendant company when he learned that the 
Insurance Commissioner was challenging the Heaton and 
Knapp properties as admissible assets, and dispose of them. 
That was n~ither his duty nor prerogative. \ Vhat does that 
have to do with laches? Defendant does point out that Knapp 
did inquire of Bullard as to progress he was making, to which 
tt 
o: 
v.· 
.. 
\ 
. .;: 
rou 
I~ 
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Bullard replied: "Fine." (Tr. 149). Furthermore. Knapp tes-
tified that it was his understanding that the necessary correc-
tive steps had been taken and that the company was going 
along all right, that these corrective steps having been taken. 
that was all that was required to comply with the requirements 
of the state. ( T r. 15 7. 158) . Finally defendant refers to the 
conversation which Heaton had with Knapp, early in August. 
1955. regarding a transaction by which Knapp might repur-
chase from defendant just the real estate and water stock which 
was a part. only. of the property described in and given as 
security for one of the two contracts which Knapp had sold to 
defendant. It should be remembered that Heaton was the 
instigator of these negotiations, not defendant. in order that 
Knapp would not think ill of Heaton when he received 
back his Bloomington property by cancellation of the deal 
with defendant. This was no offer to restore Knapp to stat-
us quo on the basis of recision for fraud. Defendant had 
never admitted fraud and up to this time Knapp had never 
suspected fraud. Indeed. it was utterly impossible for defend-
ant to restore to Knapp what it had received from him. He 
had assigned two contracts which were eac~ -~ured by certain 
definitely described property and as a coUateral action had 
deeded the land and transfered the underlying security to 
defendant. Defendant. almost simultaneously cancelled the 
.existing Knapp contracts and wrote two entirely new and dif-
ferent ones, dated 'December 30. 1954. reciting that they 
were "in lieu" of the Knapp contracts. The Knapp contracts 
had been annihilated by the voluntary action of defendant and 
couldn't have been returned. Furthermore. in April 1955, 
months before this alleged offer to trade back occurred. and 
even before the alleged offer to trade back which defendant 
claims occurred prior to the May 10. 1955 meeting. every foot 
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of livestock and all machinery, equipment, hay and the per-
sonal property had, with the consent of defendant, been 
.stripped from the farm and sold by V olma Heaton for ap-
proximately $5,000.00 which was retained by him as his 
equity. 
Therefore, the most that could be claimed for this Au-
gust discussion with Knapp was that it was a feeler by defend-
ant to ascertain whether Knapp was willing, not to rescind 
and be restored to status quo, but rather to purchase a part 
only of the property which secured the two then extinct 
contracts he had turned to defendant, on terms and at a price 
fixed by defendant and which bore no relationship whatever 
to the price at which he had sold to defendant. No wonder 
he showed no interest. But even so, defendant did not offer 
to negotiate but told Heaton it couldn't take Knapp's stock 
back anyhow since the stock had been issued and couldn't 
legally be cancelled by defendant. Therefore, defendant did 
not actually make a bona fide offer to trade back, nor even to 
.sell the farm and water back to Knapp. 
\Ve emphasize, as did the court at the trial. that it was 
two contracts of sale which plaintiffs sold to defendant, rather 
than the property described in the contracts. ( T r. 799). The 
property was the underlying security of the contracts, but seller 
had no more right to said property than a stranger, if the buyers 
performed and completed payment. The contracts might be 
worth more or less than the property which secured same, de-
pending on many factors, including the moral risk of the buy-
ers, their financial condition, the earnings on the contracts, etc. 
We submit that no inference of original fraud could be 
drawn from these negotiations \\'ith Knapp to sell him the 
fatm because it was thoroughly consistent with an absence 
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of fraud. It was generally known that this Knapp farm was 
an inadmissible asset and had to be changed into some other 
Jorm by sale or otherwise to make it acceptable. That was the 
burden of the complaint of the Insurance Commissioner and 
had been discussed at the stockholders' meeting. Knapp knew 
this and although he had thought that the corrective steps had 
been taken after the May meeting, when this proposal to sell 
hi!m the fa11m was made, it was nothing to make him suspicious 
that he had been defrauded in its acquisition, originally, by 
defendant. No reasonable man will think differently. Knapp 
knew that defendant was endeavoring to convert the Knapp 
real estate into cash in order to become an admissible asset. 
(Tr. 134-5). 
Summarizing our position that notice of election to re-
scind was given within a reasonable tlme and that plaintiffs 
are not barred from rescinding by lack of diligence or by laches, 
we make these points: 
(a) Plaintiffs first had reason to suspect fraud in the 
early part of September, 1955 and Knapp immediately placed 
,the matter in the hands of his attorney to investigate for fraud. 
The attorney proceeded expeditiously to determine the facts 
and in view of the technical investigation required, plaintiffs. 
in a very short time, served notice, on October 25, 1955, of 
election to rescind. There could be no laches her. 
(b) There was no offer to trade back prior to the May 
10, 1955 meeting and therefore no notice therefrom. 
(c) There was nothing said or done at the May 10, 1955 
stockholders' meeting or in connection with the conversation in 
early August regarding the sale to Knapp of his old fafrn on 
State Street to put him on notice of fraud or to make him 
suspect that he had been defrauded. 
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(d) Even if it could be held, which plaintiffs deny, that 
plaintiffs were placed on notice of any facts at the May 10, 
1955 meeting which could have caused suspicion of fraud, we 
contend that they were not guilty of laches in giving notice of 
~election, considering the particular circumstances of this case. 
In support of plaintiffs' foregoing position we respectfully 
refer the court to the following authorities with respect to 
laches: 
Knapp had the right to presume that defendant was 
acting honestly and fairly. See Cha!mberlain v. Wakefield 
(Cal.) 213 P. 2d 62: 
"* * a person can act upon a presumption that there 
exists no intention to defraud him.'' 
See also Mayer v. Homestead Fire Insurance Company, 150 
Neb. 556, 35 N. W. 2d 413. 
Mere suspicion is not "knowledge of fraud." See Hart-
ford Empire Company v. Glenshaw Glass Co. (Pa.) 47 F. 'D. 
711, which holds that: 
'·A mere suspicion or opportunity to learn the 
truth through the exercise of reasonable diligence does 
not constitute 'knowledge of fraud' sufficient to con-
stitute failure to assert right within a reasonable time 
'laches' barring recovery for fraud." 
It is stated thus in 9 Am. Jur. 391: 
"48. \Vant of Diligence in Discovering Fraud or 
Mistake ........ Generally in cases of active misrepresenta-
tion or fraud practiced by one party to a contract on 
the other. mere want of diligence in discovering fraud 
does not deprive the injured party of a right to recis-
sion. He owes the other party no duty of active vigi-
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lance, and required only to act promptly after discovery 
o/ /raud." 
A person is not required to investigate matters of a tech-
nical nature of which seller has full knowledge and buyer has 
none: 
''There are many exceptions to the general rule 
stated in Carpenter v. Hamilton, 11 8Cal. App. 2d 
69, 75; 62 P. 2d 1397, to the effect that in fraud 
cases, where the buyer is aware of suspicious circum-
stances or has learned of the falsity of one or more of 
the representations, he is under a legal duty to make a 
complete investigation and may not rely on the state-
ments of the seller. They are ( 1) that the buyer is not 
.required to employ experts to investigate matters of a 
technical nature of which the seller has full knowledge 
and the buyer has none. and if for this reason the in-
vestigation is incomplete he may show that he relied 
on representations as to matters which he did not in-
vestigate; ( 2) that a buyer is not chargeable with 
knowledge of conditions which he fails to discover 
because of some artifice or deception of the seller. For 
other exceptions see Palladine v. Imperial Valley Farm 
Lands Association, 65 Cal. App. 727, 225 P. 291." 
Lobdell v. Miller, (Cal.) 250 P. 2d 357. 
See Utah case of Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P. 2d 769: 
"Equitable relief from fraud will not be granted 
where party was negligent in relying upon misrepre-
sentations under grossly suspicious circumstances. but 
n.uch rule is not applicable where examination o/ sub-
ject matters would require special training or technical 
knowledge.'' 
See also Chamberlain v. Wakefield (Cal.) 213 P. 2d 62. 
In this case, Knapp, to discover the fraud, was under the 
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necessity of either employing an auditor or awaiting the com-
pletion of the Insurance Department audit to deter1mine the 
technical matters of the financial condition of defendant. 
Defendant states at pages 3 and 16, of its Brief, that 
generally the fraudulent statements related to the financial 
condition of defendant, and at page 6 it admits that it took 
all summer for the Insurance Department to audit defendant, 
yet it charges laches against plaintiffs for not discovering the 
financial condition immediately. Rather inconsistent. 
Whether laches exists, is determined by the circum-
stances of each individual case. 
''The question of laches does not depend, as 
does the Statute of Limitations, upon the fact that a 
certain definite time has elapsed since the cause of 
action accrued, but whether, under the circmnstances 
of the particular case, plaintiff is chargeable with want 
of due diligence in failing to institute or prosecute a 
proceedings." Townsend v. Landerserker, 160 U. S. 
( 171) 262 ( 16 S. Ct. 258,41 L. Ed. 383), quoted in 
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company v. Simpson. 
{Pa.) 143 A. 202. See Moresco v. Fappiano, 60 P. 
2d 430, 7 Cal. 2d 242. 
See Frailey v. McGarry, (Utah), 211 P. 2d 840. 
The court's attention is called to the following recent, 
excellent cases which hold that there can be no rigid rule as 
to reasonableness of time within which notice of recission is 
given, but that each case rests on its own special circumstances. 
King v. Los Angeles County Fair Asso. 161 P. 2d 468; Raht 
v. Sevier Mining & Milling Co., 18 Utah 290, 54 P. 889; 
Reiniger v. Hassell ( 1932) 13 P. 2d 737; Hugill v. Keene 
( 1928), 268 P. 624; Ulrich v. San Jacinto Estates, 1952. 
241 P. 2d 262; Lubarsky v. Richardson, 1933, 21 P. 2d 557; 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
Bryan v. Bawniller, 1928, 272 P. 1106; Schlake v. McCon-
nelL 1927, 257 P. 175; Miller v. Isenberg, 1949, 203 P. 2d 
11; Long v. Los Altos Country Club Properties, 1932, 9 P. 
2d 600; Sogg v. Harvey, et aL Cal. 1955, 285 P. 2d 104; 
Williams v. MarshalL 235 P. 2d 372, where it states: 
''There is no artificial rule as to lapse of time 
which will justify application of doctrine of laches, but 
each case must be determined upon basis of its facts, 
and, in absence of palpable abuse of discretion, finding 
of trial court will not be disturbed.'' 
Also, Gedstad v. Ellidunen, et al. Cal. 1954, 269 P. 2d 661; 
Chung v. Johnston, Cal. 1954, 274 P. 2d 922: Lobdell, et al. 
vs. Miller, Cal. 1953, 250 P. 2d 357. (This is an exception-
ally fine case on this and other points involved in the case at 
bar.) A reasonable time for recission after discovery of fraud 
is allowed before laches exists. 
See 55 Am. Jur. 1007; Mawhinney v. Jensen (Utah) supra. 
Laches is not allowed unless recision is delayed an un-
reasonable time and injury results. The California case of 
Lobdell v. Miller, supra, held that fifteen months delay did 
not constitute laches and was considered a reasonable time 
when utilized in investigation as to the falsity of the represen-
tations. The case of Williams v. Marshall, supra, holds that 
time taken in investigation of fraud, 15-1/2 months in this 
case, is not laches and did not justify application of the doc-
trine of laches. In the following cases there was held to be no 
laches: One year, Richards v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 94 
P. 393, 7 Cal. App. 387: three years, Cook v. Darnell. 280 
P. 383, 100 Cal. App. 482; from September 1882 to January 
1884 Sears v. Hicklin, 21 P. 1022. 13 Colo. 143; from May 
1914 to October 1917, Bedal v. Johnson, 218 P. 641, 37 
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Idaho 359; short of limitation period, Billings v. Billings, 287 
P. 46, 156 Wash. 505; three years. Gould v. James (Wyo.) 
299 P. 275; October 20, 1926 to February 25, 1931. Ander-
son v. Puget Sound Savings & Loan Asso. 18 P. 5, 171 
Wash. 378; seven months while investigating, Lynds v. 
Los Angeles-Denair Farms Co., 20 P. 2d 792, 131 Cal. App. 
58; two years, Dunn v. Security-First National Bank. 21 P. 
2c 64 7, 131 Cal. App. 54 1; from September 23, 1925 to 
June 26, 1926, long v. Los Altos Country Club Properties, 
9 P. 2d. 600, 122 Cal. App. 116: even in the case where 
plaintiff collected rents for 18 months after discovery of fraud. 
he was held not guilty of laches, Ellis v. Jones, 8 P. 2d 933. 
121 Cal. App. 325: five months. Spadoni v. Maggenti. 1932. 
8 P. 2d 874: 11 months. Fisher v. Brotherton, 1927, 255 P. 
854; ten months. Stewart v. Crowley, 1931, 3 P. 2d 562. 
Some cases have held plaintiff not to be guilty of laches 
where delayed. on advice of attorney or while attorney was 
investigating. Karr v. Sacramento Clay Products Company, 
170 P. 446. 35 Cal. App. 439; Wagaman v. Reid Inc. 42 
P. 2d 678. 5 Cal. App. 2d 168. 
\Ve have shown that there was no unreasonable delay 
after Knapp first discovered fraud or should, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered it. Therefore, since there was no 
unreasonable delay in serving the notice of recission. but, on 
the contrary, great diligence was shown, under the circum-
stancs. there would be no laches on this ground. 
In support of its claim that plaintiffs' action is barred by 
laches, defendant states that when Knapp, in August 1955, 
turned down the deal to purchase back his former real estate. 
he said he would "wait and see what happens." \Ve submit 
~that the preponderance of the evidence is that this statement 
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was never made by Knapp. The only evidence that it was is 
hearsay, wherein Anderson, general counsel of defendant and 
original attorney in this case, until he became a witness, stated 
that Heaton told him Knapp had made that statement. It 
should be remembered that Knapp was not present when this 
alleged statement was made. Knapp and Heaton denied it, 
because on direct and particularly on cross-examination they 
both related the entire conversation between them at the time 
of the alleged statement and such a statement was not a part 
of the conversation as they both related it. Therefore, they 
must both be deemed to have denied its utterance. 
But, let us assume, for purpose of argument, that it had 
been made. Of what significance was it? Here, Knapp was 
tin possession of no facts indicating he had been defrauded. He 
didn't become aware of such until about 30 days thereafter. 
He most certainly didn't know of his right to rescind but didn't 
even suspect it. Therefore there was no intentional relinquish-
ment of a ''known right,'' no one had even mentioned the 
possibility of Knapp's having been defrauded. If Knapp had 
actually made such a statement, it would be consistent with our 
view that he was simply saying that he didn't like what was 
being dished up for him and "would wait and see what hap-
pens." Or, in other words, would see if they would make him 
a better offer of sale or wait and see if they couldn't take some 
other corrective means to sell this to someone else to convert it 
to an acceptable asset. No one denies that Knapp knew that 
defendant was having difficulty with the two big properties 
and wanted to get rid of them, but not even Anderson suggests 
that the question of fraud was ever mentioned to Heaton or 
that he went to Knapp to settle a liability of defendant for 
fraud. It was initiated by Heaton so he wouldn't be criticized 
_by Knapp for getting out and leaving Knapp in. 
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If Knapp had made such a statement, it was a casual one 
and the case of Atkinson v. Bland, {W. Va.) 40 S. E. 587, 
58 L. R. A. 788, stated that casual statements in social and 
business ,matters are not sufficient to operate an estoppel in 
pais. We submit that it is equally true that they are not suf-
ficient to constitute laches. 
Support is given to our theory that if Knapp did make 
such a statement, it is explainable along other lines not con-
sistent with an intent to waive his right to rescind. In the fol-
lowing language of Judge Wolfe in his concurring opinion in 
the case of Payson Building & Loan Society v. Taylor, 48 P. 
2d 894: 
"I cannot say under all the circumstances of this 
case that the Taylors were guilty of such delay as to 
infer abandonment or waiver of their right to have the 
note and mortgage declared null or that any of their 
acts were such as not to be explainable along other 
lines not consistent with an intent to waive such right." 
Waiver of right to rescind must be established by the 
clearest evidence. 
"* * an act subsequent to the commission of a 
fraud relied upon as constituting waiver of the right 
to rescind on account of such fraud must be established 
by the clear evidence if account is to be taken thereof.'' 
24 Am. Jur. 124. 
Suspicion of one false statement, of many claimed rep-
resentations, would not necessarily preclude recovery on other 
claimed false representations. 
"The mere fact that plaintiffs may have become 
suspicious that one or more of the many claimed rep-
resentations were false would not necessarily preclude 
a recovery upon the other claimed false representa-
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tions." Lobdell v. Miller, (Cal.) 250 P. 2d 357. 
See also Shearer v. Cooper 21 Cal. 2d 695, 134 P. 2d 764, 
and Blackman v. Howse, 82 Cal. App. 2d. 275, 280, 185 P. 
2d 1019. 174 A. L. R. 1004. 
Now let us tum to the cases cited in defendant's Brief 
on this subject of laches. We have carefully read most of 
these cases and discover certain interesting facts and conclu-
sions. First: Almost all are California cases and rest on Section 
1691 of the Civil Code of California covering recission and 
the requirement of prompt recission. The California cases of 
Ferguson v. Edgar, 1918, 171 P. 1061; Cohn v. Harada, 
1917, 168 P. 1151; Peoples Calif. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 
126 P. 516; and Campbell v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 
9 P. 2d 264, emphasize that under the specific provisions of 
the above section, the right of rescission must be promptly 
exercised. The case of City & County of San Fran cisco v. 
Trans-bay Construction Co .. 134 P. 2d 468, 320 U. S. 749, 
held that this section is rigidly applied. Utah has no such sta-
tute. It is apparent that under the rigid interpretation of this 
statute the requirement for prompt rescission is greater than 
under the common law. unaided by statute. Second: Practical-
ly every one of defendant's cited cases involved much longer 
delays than in our case and many also involved acceptance 
of benefits or positive ratification after discovery of fraud. 
Knapp received no benefits of any kind. Practically every one 
of the cases holding that there was laches says there was no 
explanation or excuse for the delay. Knapp has fully and sat-
isfactorily explained the reason for his short delay. Let us refer 
specifically to the cases cited by defendant. The Utah case of 
Taylor, cited at page 13 of defendant's Brief involved a three 
year delay after discovery of fraud; in the Utah case of McKel-
ler. page 13, the plaintiff had built other buildings on the 
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property after discovery of fraud and the case is not in point, 
in any event. In the Utah case of Levine, page 14, plaintiff 
received contract pa)ments for eleven months after fraud dis-
covery and delayed 2-1/2 years. In the Gedstad case, page 
14, 3-112 years passed after fraud discovery and 1-1/2 years 
after plaintiff had written a letter saying he had discovered 
,fraud. In this case there was no showing of the reason for the 
delay. In the Bancroft case, page 14, there was a 2-1/2 year 
delay and plaintiff dealt with the property as his own after 
fraud discovery. In the Cct,mpbell case. page 14, there was 
over nine months of unexplained delay and plaintiff was al-
ready in default on his contract. The King case, page 15, in-
volved a two year and one month delay after transfer of assets 
and one year and two months after dissolution of corporation, 
with no explanation for delay. In the Estrada case, page 15. 
twenty months elapsed after discovery of fraud and fifteen 
months after discovery of right to rescind. In the Harrington 
case, page 16, plaintiff was in the house four years before ob-
jecting to the contract. Claimed he didn't discover fraud for 
two years. but paid interest on mortgage sixteen months after 
fraud discovery. The Lady Washington case, page 16, in-
volved over three years delay. The Ruhl case, page 16. in-
volved a very long delay and turned on affirmance after 
discovering fraud. Finally in our own Utah case of Raht. page 
24. plaintiff slept on rights over three years; knew of sale of 
stock and assented thereto. The Skola case. page 24. was based 
on the California Code, Section 1691 and involved over three 
months delay and plaintiff made decision to sell his stock. 
It would therefore seem that any statement by any of 
these cases that thirty days is long enough to rescind is pure 
dicta. 
(b) Delay alone, without detriment or change 
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in position, caused by the delay, is not 
laches or a defense to an action in rescission. 
As the trial court correctly observed at the triaL (Tr. 
141, 142) delay alone, without detriment or change in posi-
tion, caused by the delay, is not laches or a defense to an action 
in rescission. We shall hereafter cite authorities to support this 
contention. In this case there could have been no detriment to 
or change in the position of defendant, resulting from plaintiffs 
alleged delay in making election and serving notice. Defendant 
argues that it was damaged, because the delay rendered it 
impossible to return plaintiffs to status quo, and the reorganiza-
tion of defendant was permitted to proceed to the detriment 
of the financial interests who took over the company. 
As previously pointed out in this Brief. defendant by 
its own voluntary action and before even it suggests Knapp 
had anything to make him suspicious of fraud, placed it be-
yond its power to put Knapp back in status quo or any sem-
blance of his original position when, on December 30, 1954. 
simultaneously with Knapp's assignments of his contracts to 
defendant, it cancelled the Knapp contracts and wrote entirely 
new ones of different terms, assets, security and parties, "in 
lieu of" Knapp's, and when in April 1955, it authorized Volma 
Heaton to strip the place of all livestock, sell same and keep 
the $5,000.00 as his equity. When Knapp assigned the con-
tracts there was a balance of over $6500.00 owing on the 
livestock contract alone, besides livestock, machinery and 
equipment included in the so-called real property contract. 
Clearly any delay of Knapp could not have contributed to the 
changed position of defendant or resulted in detriment to it 
by reason of its inability to restore to status quo. 
Knapp owed no duty to the financiers who were taking 
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over the company on reorganization, but if he had had such 
duty, they were put on notice that he might ask for his prop-
erty back and acted with their eyes open, because Knapp 
testified, without contradiction, that he so told Tucker, the 
representative of these new people, when he first suspected 
fraud in SeptEmber or October 1955, (Tr. 153 to 156), so 
there could have been no possible prejudice or change in posi-
tion resulting from Knapp's delay and therefore no laches 
which will bar his recovery. 
The case of Fabian v. Alphonzo Bell Corporation, cited 
by defendant as authority that prejudice need not be shown, 
was based on a special statute, Section 1691 , California Civil 
Code. We submit that the great weight of authority sustains 
the law as announced by the court, that mere delay without 
prejudice or change in position is not laches and will not bar 
rescission. See Cook v. Darnell (Cal.) 280 P. 383: 
''There was neither pleading nor corresponding 
proof of any prejudice having been suffered by appel-
lant or the estate of Emma Darnell as a result of such 
delay, and such prejudice must be established before 
equitable relief will be denied upon the ground of 
laches.'' 
In the case of Mawhinney v. Jensen (Utah) 232 P. 2d. 
769, it was held that in a case of breach of contract to be 
established by reformation lapse of time in and of itself does 
not generally constitute laches, there must also be showing 
of injury or prejudice caused by delay. In the case of Frailey 
v. McGarry (Utah) 211 P. 2d 840, after stating that it was 
not necessary to rescission that a party act instantaneously 
upon discovering fraud but only within a reasonable time 
thereafter, with reference to all the circumstances of the par-
ticular case, the court stated: 
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"Particularly, he must, if possible. avoid such a 
delay as will make the ensuing rescission injurious to 
the other party or to the intervening interests of third 
parties. He must use reasonable diligence in ascertain-
ing the facts which may entitle him to rescind. and 
must act so soon after the discovery of them as that 
the opposite party will not be unnecessarily prejudiced 
by the delay." 
See 9 Am. Jur. 390, as follows: 
"Section 47. When delay does not constitute 
laches or ratification. Only reasonable promptness is 
required of one seeking to rescind on the ground of 
fraud. A mere delay or lapse of time alone, which 
works no prejudice or disadvantage to the defendant, 
will not bar the plaintiff of. his right to relief on the 
grounds of laches or ratification." 
In the case of Pennsylvania, Hartford-Empire Company 
v. Glenshaw Glass Co .. 47 F. S. 711, the court held that a 
delay of 23 years was not laches unless the other party had 
been injured by the delay. 
In the California case of Richards v. Farmers & Mer-
chants Bank. 94 P. 393. 7 Cal. App. 387, it was held that a 
delay of almost a year after plaintiff's discovery of fraud did 
not bar rescission since defendants were unharmed by the delay. 
The Washington case of Billings v. Billings, 287 P. 46, 
156 Wash. 505, held that the grantor in misleading grantee's 
mortgagees, not causing them to alter position to their injury. 
but guilty only of delay in objecting to .mortgages was not 
estopped by laches, short of limitation period, to assert invalid-
ity thereof. It was held in the California case of Carr v. Sac-
ramento Clay Products Company, 170 P. 466, 35 Cal. App. 
439, that a servant who delayed bringing action to rescind a 
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release of dffillages for SCflle months by reason of advice of 
a reputable attorney was not guilty of laches where the master's 
position was not changed. 
The case of McDevitt v. Butte City Ranch. 46 P. 2d 
290, 7 Cal. App. 2d. 252 holds that the defense of laches 
should not be entertained in an action for rescission of contract 
unless it would be inequitable to deny defense. The Wash-
ington case of Anderson Estate v. Puget Sound Savings & 
Loan Association, 18 P. 2d 5, 171 Wash. 378, held that a 
delay from October 20, 1926 until February 25, 1931 was 
not laches where the delay did not prejudice the payee. The 
California case of Earl v. Lofquist, 27 P. 2d 416, 135 Cal. 
App. 373, held that laches would not be presumed from a 
delay in suing for fraud until 17 months after discovery thereof 
in the absence of an affirmative showing of prejudice resulting 
therefrom. 
The Colorado case of Rogers v. Fitzsimmons, 257 P. 
2d. 420, holds this: 
''In the absence of any change of position of 
parties that would make it inequitable for purchaser 
to enforce right of rescission on ground of fraud as to 
representation concerning dimensions of property. pur-
chaser \-vas not guilty of laches.'' 
See also Hill v. Associated Almond Growers. 265 P. 873, 
90 Cal. App. 291, and the case of \Vicks v. Smith 21 Kans. 
412. 30 Am. Rep. 433: Chase v. Chase (R.I.) 37 A. 804. 
quoting Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, Volume 5, para-
graph 21. and Connor v. Hodgen {Wash). 267 P. 674: 
Samuel v. King {Tenn.) 14 S. W. 2d 963: Parks v. Classen 
Company (Okla.) 9 P. 2d 452: Hughes v. \\lallace. (Ky.) 
118 S. 334. 
\Ve have read and refer this court to the following addt-
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tional. recent cases which unequivocally hold that mere delay 
without prejudice is not laches and will not bar rescission. A 
particularly good case is the recent one of Beckett v. Kaynar 
Mfg. Co., decided in 1957. 315 P. 2d 425, which analyzes 
and distinguishes two of the principal cases cited by defend-
ants to the effect that no prejudice must be shown, to-wit, 
Bancroft v. Woodward, supra, and Gedstad v. Ellechman, 
supra. We urge a reading of this case as it destroys the effec-
tiveness ·of the two principal cases cited by defendant. See 
also Long v. Los Altos Country Club Properties, supra: 
Barnette v. Wells Fargo Nevada National Bank of San 
Francisco, 1926, 270 U. S. 438; 70 L. Ed. 669: Hill v. As-
sociated Almond Growers, 1928, 265 P. 873; Stone v. 
McCarty, 1923, 220 P. 690: Reid v. Holcomb, 1923, 218 
P. 76: Menefee v. Oxman, 1919, 183 P. 379: 'Deasy v. Tay-
lor, 1919, 178 P. 538: Gerstang v. Skinner, 1913, 134 P. 
329: Carr v. Sacramento Clay Products Co. 1918, 170 P. 
446: Damerel v. North American Bond & Mortg. Co. 1933, 
24 P. 2d 237: McDevett v. Butte City Ranch, 1925, 46 P. 
2d 290. 
(c) Conclusion of Trial Court, as to whether party 
had acted promptly to rescind a contract, or is 
guilty o/ laches, will not be set aside by appellate 
court i/ the conclusion /inds substantial support 
in the evidence. 
The trial court found ( R. 21 ) that plaintiffs are en-
titled to rescind the transaction, did not waive their right to 
rescind, were not guilty of such delay or laches as to justify 
denying their right to rescission and are not estopped by their 
conduct or by any delay ·to demand rescission. If there is sub-
stantial evidence to support these findings, the Appellate 
Court will not disturb such findings or reverse the judgment. 
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This is well stated in a recent California case decided in 
1955, Sogg v. Harvey, 285 P. 2d. 104, in the following lan-
guage: 
"Whether a party claiming to have been de-
frauded has rescinded promptly depends on the circum-
stances o/ the particular case and is a question primarily 
for the trial court. French v. French. 191, Cal. 5 79, 
589, 217 P. 515; Noll v. Baida, 202 Cal. 98, 105. 
259 P. 433; Esau v. Briggs, 89 Cal. App. 2d 427. 
438, 201 P. 2d 25. It is a question o/ /act. Miller v. 
Eisenberg, 90 Cal. App 2d 479, 482, 203 P. 2d 11. 
The conclusion o/ the trial court will not be set aside by 
a reviewing court i/ it /inds reasonable support in the 
evidence. McCray v. Title Ins. & Trust Co .. 12 Cal. 
App. 2d 537. 538. 55 P. 2d 1234." 
To the same effect are the following cases: Utah case of 
Cole v. Parker, 1956, 300 P. 2d 623; Gedstad v. Ellichman. 
Cal.. 1954, supra; Beckett v. Kaynar Mfg. Co., supra; King v. 
Los Angeles County Fair Association, et al. supra. A particu-
larly good case is that of Cole v. Calaway, Cal. 1956, 295 P. 
2d 84, stating it thusly: 
''As was said in Fabian v. .A.Iphonzo E. Bell 
Corporation, 55 Cal. App. 2d 413, 415, 130 P. 2d 
779 781: 
'The question of laches is one for the determina-
tion of the trial court and its conclusion thereon will 
not be set aside by an appellate court. if such conclu-
sion finds substantial support in the evidence. * * * 
"It is not possible to designate a definite period of 
time within which a party must give notice of recission 
of a contract because of misrepresentation, fraud etc .. 
but the facts peculiar to each case are determinative 
thereof.' See also Hunt v. L. M. Field. Inc .. 202 Cal. 
701. 705. 262 P. 730." 
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See also Chung v. Johnson, Cal. 1954, supra, Lobdell, 
et al, v. Miller, et al, Cal. 1953, supra. The case of Hunt v. 
Field, Cal 1928, 262 P. 730, is a particularly good case hold-
ing: 
"An examination of the record leads us to con-
dude that there is ample evidence to sustain the find-
ings complained of. It is true that the evidence adduced 
by the appellant conflicts in many material respects 
with that offered by the respondent. The rule is well 
settled, however, that findings based upon substantial-
ly conflicting evidence may not be disturbed by an ap-
pellate court. Taber v. Besks, 182 Cal. 214, 217, 187 
P. 746; Blanc v. Connor, 167 Cal. 719, 722, 151 P. 
217; Estate of Moore, 162 Cal. 324, 326, 122 P. 
824; Still v. San Francisco & N.W.R. Co., 154 Cal. 
559, 564, 9 P.8 672, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 322, 129 
Am. St. Rep. 177." 
See also Williams v. Marshall, Cay. 1951, supra, as follows: 
"The courts have frequently declared that there 
is no artificial rule as to the lapse of time which will 
justify the application of the doctrine of laches. Each 
case must be determined upon the basis of its facts, and 
in the absence of a palpable abuse of discretion the 
trial court's finding upon the issue will not be dis-
turbed upon appeal. Hunt v. L. M. Field, Inc., 202 
Cal. 701, 705, 262 P. 730; McDevitt v. Butte City 
Ranch, 7 Cal. App. 2d 252, 254, 46 P. 2d 290." 
These are salutory principles of law. After all, the trial 
court has before it the witnesses and is able to observe their 
demeanor, judge their credibility and more accurately evaluate 
their testimony. 
Was there substantial evidence in this case? Reference 
to and an analysis of the evidence on this matter will be 
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found under subdivisions (a) and (b) of this Point 1, to which 
we respectfully <lirect the court's attention. We earnestly 
contend that not only is there substantial evidence to support 
such finding, but that a great preponderance of such evidence 
does so, and therefore, this court should not disturb such find~ 
ing. 
POINT II 
THERE IS LEGAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE MONEY JUDGMENT 
AWARDED PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACfiON. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends that there is no evidence to support 
the money judgment awarded plaintiffs. Plaintiffs maintain 
that the evidence does support such judgment. 
\Ve feel that defendant is confusing this whole issue and 
that the cases its cites are distinguishable from our case on their 
facts and are no authority against the action of the trial court 
in awarding plaintiffs a money judgment in the amount stated. 
Every case cited by defendant, involved the trade of 
real property which was not sold under contract. In our case, 
as the trial court correctly observed, the things sold to defend-
ant were the two contracts o/ sale, which contained an un-
equivocal promise to pay, which had a definite balance owing 
at the time of assignment. They were much like any other 
obligation to pay an amount certain, and specific perfotmance 
could be compelled. Payments were right up to date. (Tr. 37). 
The real and personal property described in the contracts was 
incidental and collateral to the contracts, held merely as 
security. So long as the buyers performed under their contracts. 
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the sellers had no more rights to the possession or ownership 
of said securities than a stranger. In other words, it was not 
the properties which plaintiffs sold to defendant, but the con-
tracts of sale, secured by such properties. 
The value of the assigned contracts might depend but 
little on the value of the underlying security. Proof of the value 
of the security would not, as contended by defendant, deter-
mine the value of the contracts and is incompetent and irrele-
vant. 
Surely defendant would not contend that if the under-
lying security, which could not be returned, were shown to 
have been worth $75,000.00, although the balance owing 
on the contracts of sale, at the date of the transaction, were 
only $34,383,03, that plaintiffs would be entitled to re-
cover the Jull $75,000.00. Of course not. It would then 
correctly say that the limit of plaintiffs' recovery is the balance 
owing on the thing sold, ie., the contracts of sale. This dem-
onstrates how wrong defendant's reasoning is. Doesn't it il-
lustrate the saying, "heads I win, tails you lose"? 
It is our contention that the balance owing on the con-
tracts is the measure of the money judgment to which plain-
tiffs are entitled and that it is as though cash had been paid to 
defendant. since the contracts of the third persons to pay a 
definite amount of cash, were ~assigned. As the court remarked 
in the course of the trial. plaintiffs as sellers under the contracts 
were entitled to be paid in \Illoney the balance then due. (Tr. 
977). In case suit is brought on a promissory note or other 
promise to pay, the court doesn't inquire of the worth of the 
note, but gives a judgment for the full amount thereof. But if 
further proof of value were needed, it is supplied in the written 
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agreement of January 5, 1955, (Ex. P. 9 D. 20) wherein the 
parties solemnly declared in writing, that the value of the 
''contracts of sale,'' not, mind you, the properties described 
therein, was $34,383.03, the exact balance owing on such 
contracts. 
We submit that that definitely fixes such values, is the 
best evidence thereof. that defendant is estopped to question 
same and cannot vary the terms of that written instrument by 
parole or contradictory testimony. It is conclusive evidence of 
such value and is binding on both parties on the question of 
value. To admit evidence of the value of properties which 
secured these contracts would open up a vast field of specula-
tion and irrelevant testimony and would be error. We might 
point out that defendant made no offer of evidence as to the 
value of livestock. machinery and other personal property 
which formed a great portion of such security. (Tr. 808). 
Now, referring to the cases cited by defendant. we have 
studied each one carefully. They simply announce the cor-
rect principle that if status quo cannot be achieved by return 
of the property, the plaintiffs should be awarded a money 
judgment for the value of that which cannot be returned. We 
have no quarrel with that proposition. But not one of the cases 
involved a contract balance with a sum certain owing thereon. 
Each involved a trade of title to real property. It is true, that 
in some of them. the parties had given a receipt, stating a 
value of the traded property or had placed some value on it in 
their contracts. but when it was discovered that instead of 
being cash it was merely title to real estate which had been 
traded, the court said that in the case of rescission, where the 
property could not be returned, the real value should be ascer-
tained of the real estate traded. But, how different are the 
I 
[1/i 
Ct 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
situations and facts between those cases and ours. There the 
titles to real properties were involved and the thing was traded. 
Often puffing of values occurs in such cases, merely to effec-
tuate the trade. One fellow places a value on his property and 
the other one boosts the value of his to correspond, with little 
attention to real values. In such cases, perhaps evidence of 
real .value is justified in order to place the parties in status quo. 
In our case, there was no bartering and trading. The stock 
which plaintiffs purchased had a definite established selling 
price of $20.00 a share, and the contracts had a definite 
amount owing thereon. The parties solemnly agreed such bal-
ance was the actuaL reasonable value. Not one of defendant's 
cited cases says that the "agreed value" in such a case as ours 
is not the "real value" which should be awarded to the plain-
tiffs. 
Now referring directly to defendant's cited cases on this 
point. The Marks case cited at page 25 of their Brief holds 
that the court may make a judgment in the alternative, as the 
court did in this case. It then holds that if the real estate 
which was traded cannot be returned judgment should be 
awarded for ''the value'' thereof at the time of consummation 
of the agreement of sale. It did not say that the "agreed value" 
might not be the "real value." This is distinguished from our 
case in th0.t it involved a trade of real estate by both parties. 
The Blaknik case, page 26, was not a fraud case but failure of 
consideration. It differs from our case in that it involved a 
trade of real estate while in our case it was a contract with a 
definite balance owing. In that case credit was simply given 
for the real estate traded while in our case it was a definite 
sum owing and solemn agreement as to value. The Lasher 
case, page 27, involved two vacant lots and was not a fraud 
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case but was decided under the special California Code pro-
viding for rescission. The Swan case, on page 28, presented a 
situation where value had to be determined. A drunk man 
conveyed real property worth $21,900.00 in exchange for 
$200.00 cash and satisfaction of a $10,600.00 indebtedness. 
It is pointed out that an equity court will give relief in such 
cases. Finally, the Merigold case, page 28. was an agreement 
to purchase real estate. Receipt was acknowledged of 
$3,735.00. It was discovered that such payment was not in 
cash but in land, quite different from our case. It was not a 
fraud case but for a breach. We submit that each and every 
one of these cases are entirely distinguishable both in fact and 
in law from our case. This must have been the view also of the 
California Court because in the case of Lobdell, et al. v. 
Miller, et al. 250 P. 2d 357, decided in 1953, which is con-
siderably later than any of the cases cited by defendant in its 
Brief, the court reviews such earlier cases and then enunciates 
the following doctrine: 
''As to the item o/ $300, being the difference in 
agreed value o/ the real property deeded to defendants 
as part o/ the purchase price and the actual value there-
of as contended by defendants. the court. under its 
equitable powers. had the right to /ix the agreed value 
as the amount /or which defendants should account. 
Swan v. Talbot. 152 Cal. 142. 94 P. 238. 17 L.R.A .. 
N.S., 1066; Thompson vs. Stoakes, 46 Cal. App. 2d 
285, 293, 115 P. 2d 830; Lasher v. Faw, 209 Cal. 
726. 735, 289. P. 821." 
We most earnestly direct the court's attention to this 
case and urge that it be read, as it is a most scholarly discussion 
of many of the points found in our case and which are the 
subject of appeal. Here the court stated that the court, under 
its equitable powers, had the right to fix the agreed value as 
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the proper measure of damage. Our case is much stronger on 
'its facts than the Lobdell case because the subject of our sale 
was contracts of sale, with a definite balance owing, in money, 
and the parties solemnly agreed in writing what the real and 
reasonable value was, it being the balance owing. In the Lob-
dell case it involved merely real property. As shedding some 
light on this matter and supporting plaintiffs' views, we refer 
the court to a very recent Utah case, Cole v. Parker, supra, 
decided in 1956, wherein it was said: 
"In the absence of fraud or imposition, the parties 
-are bound by the price or measure of value they have 
agreed on, and such price must be paid notwithstanding 
it may be excessive. The courts cannot supervise de-
cisions made in the business world and grant relief when 
the bargain proves improvident. 
"Thus in the absence of a finding or fraud, the 
1seller is entitled to be credited, in the computation of 
damage sustained because of the breach of the contract, 
the difference between the contract price and the price 
for which he can sell the forfeited property. The /act 
that, according to plaintiffs' evidence, this amount ex-
ceeds the amount paid on the contract forecloses fur-
ther inquiry as to whether or not the forfeiture provision 
of the contract properly assessed the actual damages 
suffered by the defendants." 
We think the Utah case of McKeller Real Estate & In-
vestment Co., et al. v. Paxton, et al. 218 P. 128, also sustains 
plaintiffs' position in the follOMTing language: 
''The value of the premises with the building ac-
tually accepted by the defendants can only be de-
termined by the court upon testimony. The difference, 
if any, between the value as fixed by the contract and 
the actual value as completed by plaintiffs and ac-
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cepted by defendants necessarily measures the damages 
sustained by defendants.'' 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON ROMNEY, & 
GEORGE L. NELSON 
of Romney & Nelson, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY. 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
Received three copies of the foregoing Brief this _________________ _ 
day of_ ___________________________________ , 1958. 
Counsel for Defendant and Appellant 
• By--------------------------------------------------------
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